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INTRODUCTION 
Before the 1989 case of Graham v. Connor, excessive force cases 
were pursued under either state law or the insuperable “shocks the con-
science” test of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only after Graham did ex-
cessive force cases—now under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983—inundate the federal courts, which had by then granted far-
reaching immunities to officers for their constitutional torts. As a result 
of federal qualified immunity doctrine, which many states have adopted 
for themselves, excessive force cases rarely get to trial, plaintiffs often 
cannot recover, and courts struggle to find principled distinctions from 
one qualified immunity case to the next.  
In Part I of this Article, I describe the evolution of excessive force 
cases in the federal courts through § 1983 and Bivens actions. Part II de-
scribes the evolution of qualified immunity doctrine and demonstrates 
how common law immunities were traditionally held to have been incor-
porated into § 1983 by the Congress of 1871 as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation. It claims that only when the Court began hearing feder-
al Bivens actions and created an immunity doctrine untethered from stat-
utory interpretation, the common law approach was lost and the modern, 
nearly insurmountable, qualified immunity doctrine was adopted. Part II 
thus establishes the historical importance of common law interpretation 
to § 1983 suits. 
Part III shows how differently excessive force cases would have to 
be treated were the court to return to the common law interpretive meth-
ods in § 1983 cases. At common law, excessive force actions were quite 
common and more liberal toward plaintiffs seeking redress, officers were 
expected to pay damages for any unnecessary force, and it was the prov-
ince of the jury to determine such questions. 
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Finally, Part IV and Part V make the theoretical case under both 
constitutional and statutory interpretation for replacing modern qualified 
immunity doctrine with a return to its common law variety in excessive-
force actions—an approach that would also be far more judicially work-
able than the current doctrine. Once we approach excessive force cases 
from a common law perspective, the immunity and Graham inquiries are 
each modified somewhat into a single inquiry that is to be determined by 
a jury. 
I. EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE MODERN ERA 
This Part describes the evolution of excessive force cases in the 
federal courts through § 1983 and Bivens actions. Today, these cases are 
analyzed under the Graham v. Connor1 three-part (or four-part) standard 
to determine if there has been a constitutional violation.2 The test re-
quires courts to undertake an objective analysis of the circumstances sur-
rounding the use of force.3 Even if a court decides that the use of force 
was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional, the second step of the in-
quiry is the qualified immunity analysis: Was it “clearly established” that 
this kind of force in this kind of circumstance is unconstitutional?4 If not, 
the officer escapes liability.5 The implications of this two-step approach 
are significant in light of the traditional common law method for trying 
such cases.  
First, the modern approach removes power from the jury who tradi-
tionally decided whether the use of force was excessive. However, under 
the qualified immunity analysis, the first prong of the inquiry is usually a 
prerequisite to the second prong,6 which gives power to the courts to de-
cide whether the force was excessive as a matter of law.7 If at the second 
                                            
 1. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 2. The test often has been read to include a fourth prong in addition to the three outlined by the 
United States Supreme Court in Graham: the Graham test has been interpreted by the lower courts 
to require at least some quantum of physical injury that is more than de minimis. See, e.g., Fisher v. 
City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 897 (10th Cir. 2009);  see also infra note 174 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
 4. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 5. See, e.g., Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012); see also infra note 62 
and accompanying text. 
 6. The Court recently permitted courts to start with the second “clearly established” prong. See 
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231–32. Whether this will have much impact on the consequences I am de-
scribing remains to be seen. 
 7. In other words, because the court must decide the qualified immunity issue, it automatically 
decides whether there has been a constitutional violation—the first prong of the analysis—and there-
fore whether there has been excessive force. 
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prong the court decides that it was clearly established that the use of 
force was unconstitutional, then—as a matter of law—the officer is lia-
ble, and the case still logically should not get to a jury.8 
Second, the “clearly established” prong’s inquiry into qualified 
immunity is contrary to the common law. As will be discussed in Part II, 
immunity doctrine traditionally looked to the common law to derive im-
munities in § 1983 cases.9 This approach was lost, quite possibly as a 
result of historical accident as the Court began to hear Bivens actions 
directly under the Constitution and not under any statute. I believe the 
common law approach is theoretically more satisfying as a matter of 
statutory interpretation. 
Finally, once we approach excessive force cases from a common 
law perspective, the immunity and Graham inquiries are each modified 
somewhat into a single inquiry that is to be determined by a jury. This 
Article argues that in § 1983 actions under the civil rights statute and in 
Bivens actions directly under the Constitution, the common law approach 
is more consistent with original understanding and principles of interpre-
tation. 
A. Excessive Force Before and After Graham 
Before 1989 most federal courts addressed claims of excessive 
force under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 
Those depending on the Due Process Clause took the lead from Judge 
Friendly’s opinion in Johnson v. Glick,11 a pretrial detainee case. Finding 
that the facts did not fit neatly under either the Fourth or the Eighth 
Amendment, Judge Friendly held that the right to be free from police 
brutality was protected more generally by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
                                            
 8. At that point, the court will have determined all the issues—that a constitutional violation 
occurred and that the officer’s actions were clearly established as unconstitutional—and so there is 
nothing left for a jury to do. Interestingly, at this point in the litigation qualified immunity would be 
denied, and a trial on the merits could be had. But the merits trial seems redundant: after all, if the 
use of force was excessive as a matter of law and it was clearly established that it was unconstitu-
tional, a police-friendly jury could only conclude otherwise if it were to nullify the law. Thus, a 
merits trial after a denial of qualified immunity is a logical contradiction. It appears that there are 
few merits trials, likely because these cases settle after a denial of qualified immunity. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 219 
(1993); Daniel J. O’Connell, Note, Excessive Force Claims: Is Significant Bodily Injury the Sine 
Qua Non to Proving a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 739 n.2, 741 
nn.14–15, 741–44 (1990) (collecting cases). 
 11. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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due process protections.12 Judge Friendly wrote that the factors relevant 
to determine whether the police conduct “shocks the conscience” and 
thus violates due process are  
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the 
need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury in-
flicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to main-
tain or restore discipline[,] or maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm.13 
As one commentator wrote in the late-1980s, this standard had “un-
til recently enjoyed unanimous if unreflective approval in the federal dis-
trict and circuit courts. These courts have applied this standard mechani-
cally—to the claims of prisoners, pretrial detainees, suspects[,] and free 
citizens alike—regardless of the surrounding circumstances or the specif-
ic constitutional right implicated by the use of force.”14 Some courts did, 
however, analyze excessive force cases in situations such as apprehend-
ing criminals under the Fourth Amendment, as the Supreme Court did in 
the case of officers shooting a fleeing suspect.15 
The Glick test posed a challenge for plaintiffs. It is difficult to 
prove that an officer acted maliciously and without good faith. Because 
many instances of force may be excessive but very few will truly “shock 
the conscience,” Glick was an effective bar to recovery. Graham v. Con-
nor16—the decision that changed the standard for all excessive force cas-
es—demonstrates these propositions. 
In Graham, the plaintiff (Graham) had his friend take him to a store 
to resolve a blood sugar problem.17 Because the line in the store was too 
long, he ran out of the store back to his friend.18 Officers who saw him 
grew suspicious and detained him while another officer went to investi-
gate.19 The officers refused his friend’s request to give him orange juice, 
though Graham was manifestly having some reaction.20 When they 
learned that nothing was wrong the officers drove Graham home, but 
                                            
 12. Id. at 1031–32 (“[B]oth before and after sentence, constitutional protection against police 
brutality is not limited to conduct violating the specific command of the Eighth Amendment 
or . . . of the Fourth. . . . [Q]uite apart from any ‘specific’ of the Bill of Rights, application of undue 
force by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.”). 
 13. Id. at 1033. 
 14. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692, 693. 
 15. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1985). 
 16. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 17. Id. at 389. 
 18. Id. at 388–89. 
 19. Id. at 389. 
 20. Id. 
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Graham had by then “sustained a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a 
bruised forehead, . . . an injured shoulder[, and] developed a loud ringing 
in his right ear that continues to this day.”21 
Few who read the Court’s full opinion can doubt that the officers 
acted excessively and unreasonably. Of course, they probably did not 
intend to act unreasonably, but surely they should have known better? 
Under Glick that question hardly matters: even if their acts were unrea-
sonable, they were not acting maliciously or sadistically, and they were 
acting on a good faith belief that Graham may have committed a crime at 
the store he had hastily exited. 
That is exactly what the district court, relying on Glick, found in 
Graham.22 The trial had even proceeded to a jury, but the district judge 
granted the officers’ motion for a directed verdict.23 Graham did not have 
a claim as a matter of law because the court found that the use of force 
was “‘appropriate under the circumstances,’ that ‘[t]here was no discern-
able injury inflicted,’ and that the force used ‘was not applied malicious-
ly or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’ but in ‘a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore order in the face of a potentially explo-
sive situation.’”24 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that all excessive force cases 
arising out of arrests or investigatory stops must be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment, the proper textual home for them.25 The Court elim-
inated the subjective components of the excessive-force inquiry in favor 
of an objective multi-factor test to determine the reasonableness of the 
application of force. The proper application of the test  
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or 
attempting to evade arrest by flight.26  
This is an explicitly objective test, with no reference to subjective in-
tent.27 
                                            
 21. Id. at 389–90. 
 22. See id. at 390–91. 
 23. Id. at 391. 
 24. Id. at 390–91 (quoting Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248–49 (W.D.N.C. 
1986)) (alteration in original). 
 25. Id. at 394–95. 
 26. Id. at 396. 
 27. See id. at 397. 
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This test opened the floodgates to plaintiffs litigating excessive 
force claims against police officers. Those floodgates were promptly re-
closed by the application of the Court’s reinvented qualified immunity 
doctrine. 
B. Qualified Immunity: A Mess in the Circuits 
Qualified immunity had already been established as a doctrine di-
vorced from the common law at this point.28 The Court held in Saucier v. 
Katz29 that in excessive force cases qualified immunity requires, as a first 
step, an inquiry into whether a cognizable constitutional violation has 
occurred and thus a determination of whether excessive force was used 
under the Graham standard.30 Then, as a second step, the courts must 
determine whether it was “clearly established” at the time that the partic-
ular use of force was unconstitutional.31 
The level of generality at which the courts apply the second prong 
is crucial. Surely, it is clearly established that excessive force is unconsti-
tutional. That is too high a level of generality, however, and the Supreme 
Court has instructed the courts to conduct a more specific inquiry: was 
the particular use of force in these particular circumstances so clearly 
unconstitutional as to violate clearly established law?32 Answering this 
more specific inquiry requires an examination of prior case law to see 
whether it has been previously held that this kind of use of force in these 
kinds of circumstances was unconstitutional.33 
Two major problems have resulted from this doctrine. First, quali-
fied immunity in excessive force cases has created a complete mess in 
the circuit courts. As one scholar recently put it, “Despite the almost an-
nual ritual of doctrinal clarification, the federal reporters are crammed 
with dissents and en banc decisions taking issue over the proper scope 
and role of qualified immunity.”34 One only needs to choose a circuit 
                                            
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 30. See id. at 201. 
 31. Id. at 201–02. 
 32. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 
(2001)). 
 33. See, e.g., Amanda K. Eaton, Note, Optical Illusions: The Hazy Contours of the Clearly 
Established Law and the Effects of Hope v. Pelzer on the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 38 GA. L. 
REV. 661, 680 (2004) (“This survey of Eleventh Circuit qualified immunity case law demonstrates 
that the court will deny qualified immunity only when prior case law has articulated plaintiff’s con-
stitutional rights in a nearly identical factual situation.”). 
 34. Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155–56 (2005). 
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court at random to see the confusion that has resulted. I shall choose the 
Fifth Circuit.35 
In December 2012, a panel of the court decided Newman v. 
Guedry.36 The facts in this case are too good to summarize, but summa-
rize we must. After an investigative stop and subsequent arrest of the 
driver, the passenger, Newman, who had not received or resisted any 
orders, was subject to a pat-down search.37 The officer remained uncom-
fortably long over Newman’s crotch, at which point the officer alleged 
that Newman grabbed hold of his hand.38 The officer pushed him up 
against the car, and another officer came over and struck Newman’s arm 
with a baton—ten times.39 After Newman’s shorts had fallen, the officer 
struck his exposed thigh an additional three times.40 Newman (taking his 
facts as true) had not received any orders or resisted at this point.41 He 
was then tased thrice, the third time while he was on the ground.42 Re-
markably, the officer’s defense was that “after the blows to his leg, 
Newman’s body failed to comply.”43 
Even these facts could not produce a unanimous panel opinion. The 
majority held the use of force objectively unreasonable, thus satisfying 
the first prong of the qualified immunity test.44 But the second prong was 
more difficult: Was it clearly established that the particular use of force 
in these particular circumstances was unconstitutional? The officer ar-
gued that there was no binding case law on the use of tasers.45 Even if 
there had been binding case law, the matter would not have been clear-
cut. What if five, rather than three, tases were applied in a prior case? 
What if the tasers had not been used after thirteen baton strikes? 
The qualified immunity test poses an almost insurmountable analyt-
ical problem—the permutations are infinite. A given situation is rarely 
exactly like another. There will always be sufficient distinguishing facts 
to decide that there was no clearly established law. The flexibility of this 
kind of approach has led some commentators to charge that qualified 
                                            
 35. Based on the author’s own experience as a current clerk in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Beyond the confusion in the reported cases, there is tremendous internal disagreement over the 
qualified immunity defense and how it ought to be applied. 
 36. Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 37. Id. at 759–60. 
 38. Id. at 760. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 763. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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immunity doctrine permits judges to decide cases on the basis of their 
own policy judgments.46 
The Newman panel did away with this issue entirely and denied 
qualified immunity by holding that, “‘in an obvious case,’ the Graham 
excessive-force factors themselves ‘can clearly establish the answer, 
even without a body of relevant case law.’”47 The dissenting judge, how-
ever, saw no case law clearly establishing the unconstitutionality of this 
level of force in this kind of circumstance.48 “[E]xisting precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”49 
The dissenting judge compared several cases with slightly varying facts 
to determine that the present facts were more like those cases in which 
no violation had been found.50 
Ramirez v. Martinez51—decided only five months later—resulted in 
another divided panel. In that case, officers had a warrant to search 
Ramirez’s business premises to serve an arrest warrant on his sister-in-
law.52 When Ramirez arrived on the premises, officers allegedly had 
their guns drawn, pointed at his employees.53 When Ramirez asked what 
was going on, he and Officer Martinez apparently exchanged profanities, 
with Ramirez saying, “This is my business, ok?”54 The officer told 
Ramirez to turn around so he could be cuffed, and when Ramirez refused 
the order, he was tased and handcuffed.55 When on the ground, he was 
tased again.56 Charges against Ramirez for disorderly conduct were later 
dismissed.57 
The divided panel that resulted demonstrates the difficulty in apply-
ing the clearly established standard. First, the court had not before “ad-
dressed a fact pattern precisely on point,” which is of course true because 
                                            
 46. See, e.g., Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 
149–150 (1999); Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the 
Court’s Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 744 (1987). 
 47. Newman, 703 F.3d at 764 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)). 
 48. See id. at 764–69. 
 49. Id. at 767 (Barkesdale, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 
(2011)). 
 50. Id. at 768–69. The dissenting judge first listed egregious cases in which qualified immunity 
was denied, and decided that this case was not as egregious. Those other cases involved an arrestee 
in a diabetic coma being beaten with flashlights, an officer slamming a door on an arrestee’s head, 
and an officer firing two rounds into a car occupied by children. 
 51. Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 52. Id. at 372. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 372–73. 
 56. Id. at 373. 
 57. Id. 
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these precise facts were never before the court.58 Nevertheless, because 
one case had held that use of force after the subject was subdued was 
excessive, the court decided the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to sup-
port a finding of excessiveness because he was tased once he was already 
subdued.59 The panel in Ramirez relied on the same case to decide that 
the law was also clearly established.60 The dissent, however, relied on 
other similar cases to suggest that “a jury could not find that no reasona-
ble officer would have tased Ramirez two times.”61 
Those were two cases in which qualified immunity was denied. In 
what was arguably a more egregious case than either Ramirez or New-
man, the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to officers in the 2012 
case Poole v. City of Shreveport.62 The evidence, assessed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, showed that Poole was pulled over for a traffic 
violation, passed a field sobriety test, and argued with an officer who had 
tailgated him in an unmarked car.63 He refused to give his hand when the 
officers wanted to arrest him, at which point he was tased and forcibly 
handcuffed.64 Poole claimed that while he refused to be arrested, he was 
not otherwise physically resistant or violent to the officers.65 At the end 
of the encounter, Poole had suffered an arm injury requiring “multiple 
surgeries,” and his left arm and hand suffered “permanent disabilities.”66 
The court held that the officers’ use of force was not unreasonable be-
cause Poole had refused to surrender his right arm so he could be 
cuffed.67 
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit again granted qualified immunity, this 
time to an officer who had shot three times at a suspect, Robbie Tolan, 
with one bullet hitting him in the chest.68 Tolan was suspected of stealing 
the vehicle he exited, although he was in his own driveway and his par-
ents had even come out to argue with the officers, insisting that it was 
their own car.69 Tolan was shot when he got off of the ground (where he 
was lying face down) once one of the officers shoved his mother against 
                                            
 58. Id. at 378 
 59. Id. (citing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
 60. Id. at 379. (citing Bush, 513 F.3d at 501). 
 61. Id. at 382 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
 62. 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 63. Id. at 625. 
 64. Id. at 625–26. 
 65. Id. at 626. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 629. 
 68. See Tolan v. Cotton, 713 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 301–02. 
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the garage door.70 This case was so egregious that it resulted in a state-
court trial, and yet it was apparently not egregious enough for the Fifth 
Circuit panel to deny qualified immunity.71 
Whatever the individual merits of each case, what they show in 
tandem is that under modern qualified immunity doctrine it is very diffi-
cult to discern a principled way to decide such cases. 
The second problem resulting from the modern qualified immunity 
doctrine, which needs little illustration, is that plaintiffs rarely get recov-
ery.72 As the Fifth Circuit cases surveyed above illustrate, it is difficult to 
show that the law “clearly established” that certain force under particular 
circumstances was unconstitutional given the almost infinite possibilities 
for distinguishing facts. 
In addition to the two major problems previously discussed, there is 
a third problem, which is the crux of this Article: These results are hardly 
required by the common law or principles of statutory or constitutional 
interpretation. For now, we should keep in mind the above practical con-
sequences when considering the importance of the theoretical claims 
made in Parts IV and V below. Not only is the common law approach 
better as a matter of theory, there is a considerable argument that it will 
be superior on a practical level. 
The next Part describes how the doctrine of qualified immunity 
evolved. In the doctrine’s first few decades, the court examined the im-
munities that existed at common law for a public official’s conduct. The-
se common law immunities were held as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion to have been incorporated by Congress into the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, which included the language that is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It was 
only when the Court began to hear federal Bivens actions untethered 
from any statute that the common law approach was lost. This next Part 
thus demonstrates the importance of returning to a common law ap-
proach when trying excessive force cases. Part III describes how exces-
                                            
 70. Id. at 303. 
 71. Id. 
 72. “Most academics and jurists agree, however, that the qualified immunity defense is one of 
the most substantial barriers to the success of lawsuits seeking damages against federal officials for 
constitutional violations.” Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 477, 479 (2011). Diana Hassel writes, “An apparent duplication of the objective rea-
sonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment in excessive force cases and the same objective 
reasonableness standard in the qualified immunity doctrine has created a nearly impenetrable de-
fense to excessive force claims.” Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 118 
(2009). The standards are not quite the same—establishing that the unconstitutionality was clearly 
established is much more difficult than establishing the underlying unconstitutional behavior—but 
Hassle’s point is well-taken. It is still my view, however, that a merits trial after a denial of qualified 
immunity would be a contradiction. See supra note 8. 
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sive force cases were tried at common law and also demonstrates that the 
legal disarray described above would be resolved with the common law 
approach. The remainder of the Article concludes with the theoretical 
case for a return to this historical method for trying excessive force cas-
es. 
II. EVOLUTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
A. Common Law Immunities and § 1983: 1951–1982 
The Supreme Court first discussed common law immunities in a 
§ 1983 suit in the middle of the twentieth century.73 In 1947, the Senate 
of the California State Legislature formed a committee to investigate 
“un-American” activities.74 Two years later, William Brandhove circu-
lated a petition apparently encouraging the legislature to defund the 
committee, alleging that the committee had conspired with the “Republi-
can machine in San Francisco” to smear a particular congressman as a 
“Red.”75 The committee hauled Brandhove before it, where he refused to 
give testimony, for which he was prosecuted for contempt in state 
court.76 Brandhove then sued Jack Tenney (head of the committee) and 
others for conspiring to deprive him of his constitutional rights to free 
speech and petition by harassing him.77 He argued that the committee 
had no legislative purpose in questioning him.78 
The district court dismissed the suit for failing to state a cause of 
action under section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871—what would be 
later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983—but the Ninth Circuit reversed.79 The 
Supreme Court took up the case to explain that even if the facts might 
otherwise state a cause of action under the enforcement statute (the Civil 
Rights Act), it did not do so on these facts.80 The Court delved into Eng-
lish and American political and constitutional history to find that legisla-
tors are essentially completely immune for acts they undertake as legisla-
tors and that, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress did not 
abrogate these legislative privileges so deeply rooted in our constitution-
al and political history.81 
                                            
 73. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
 74. Id. at 369–70. 
 75. Id. at 370. 
 76. Id. at 370–71. 
 77. Id. at 371. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 372. 
 81. Id. at 376. 
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The Court held, 
We think it is clear that the legislation on which this action is 
founded does not impose liability on the facts before us, once they 
are related to the presuppositions of our political history. The privi-
lege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what 
they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parlia-
mentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.82 
The Court further cited to the English Bill of Rights Act of 1689, which 
had capped an almost century-long constitutional struggle with the Stu-
arts, and which unequivocally guaranteed the right of members of par-
liament to be free from prosecution for their actions in parliament.83 The 
Act had declared, among other rights, “That the Freedom of Speech, and 
Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or 
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.”84 
The American colonists retained this constitutional victory, and the 
American founders cemented it in their founding documents: 
Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a mat-
ter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the Crown 
and founded our Nation. It was deemed so essential for representa-
tives of the people that it was written into the Articles of Confedera-
tion and later into the Constitution.85 
The Supreme Court brought to bear all of the sources modern originalists 
would use to establish the historical understanding of a particular consti-
tutional provision.86 It gave the reasons for this constitutional rule, as 
articulated by James Wilson, one of the Framers of the Constitution; it 
established the rule’s presence in three state constitutions at the time of 
the founding; and it noted that the rule became so well-entrenched that 
forty-one of the forty-eight state constitutions contained its protection.87 
The Court was not using this history for purposes of constitutional 
interpretation but rather for purposes of statutory interpretation.88 When 
Congress passed section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, did it intend 
to impose liability for the actions of legislators long held—because of an 
old and profound constitutional and political history dating back to the 
                                            
 82. Id. at 372 (capitalization in original). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (quoting Bill of Rights Act of 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2) (capitalization in original). 
 85. Id. at 373; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“Senators and Representatives . . . for any 
Speech or Debate in either House . . . shall not be questioned in any other Place.”). 
 86. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373–75. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 376. 
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1600s—immune from such liability? The Court held almost unanimously 
(with only Justice Douglas dissenting) that Congress did not abrogate 
this deeply rooted tradition of legislative immunity; or at least, the Court 
would not assume that Congress abrogated it without more specific legis-
lative language: 
Let us assume, merely for the moment, that Congress has constitu-
tional power to limit the freedom of [s]tate legislators acting within 
their traditional sphere. That would be a big assumption. But we 
would have to make an even rasher assumption to find that Con-
gress thought it had exercised the power. These are difficulties we 
cannot hurdle. The limits of [sections] 1 and 2 of the 1871 stat-
ute . . . were not spelled out in debate. We cannot believe that Con-
gress—itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would im-
pinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by cov-
ert inclusion in the general language before us.89 
Thus, the immunity doctrine in § 1983 actions was born.90 It is 
worth detailing the reasoning of the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove be-
cause of the difference in the Court’s approach then and now in modern 
qualified immunity cases. The former, as described above, is rooted in 
statutory interpretation, which itself is rooted in history, tradition, and 
common law. The latter, as we shall see in Part II.B, is a judicially creat-
ed doctrine rooted in the Justices’ views of public policy (and arguably, 
poor public policy at that). Moreover, the Court’s reasoning in Tenney 
may help persuade us, in Part V, that its approach is satisfying as a theo-
retical matter. To preview, a strong case can be made that common law 
immunities were indeed incorporated into the 1871 statute, not because 
they are written there explicitly but because the legislators and the people 
would have understood the language to include these deeply rooted 
common law and constitutional principles. 
In Tenney, the Court dealt with an unquestionable application of 
§ 1983. There, the state laws (and specifically the Constitution) gave the 
legislature authority to undertake the acts in question.91 Thus, Brandhove 
had a proper claim under § 1983 because the defendants were literally 
acting “under color of” a “law” or “statute”; that is, they were acting 
consistently with an authority bestowed upon them by statute. It was 
hardly clear then whether an officer acting in violation of his statutory 
authority—say, by conducting an admittedly illegal search or seizure—
                                            
 89. Id. 
 90. Note that in Tenney, the Court held that legislators had an absolute, not a qualified, immun-
ity. 
 91. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 369–70. 
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could still be liable for § 1983 violations for merely acting under color of 
state “authority.” Monroe v. Pape,92 decided ten years after Tenney, an-
swered this question in the affirmative. 
There has been tremendous historical and legal debate over the 
holding of Monroe. Justice Frankfurter in that case, followed most nota-
bly by Justice Scalia in more modern cases, argued that only if a state 
statute authorized the particular actions could the officer be liable under 
§ 1983.93 An officer acting in excess of his statutorily granted authority 
could only be liable under state law, for example, in a battery or trespass 
case. Only when state law did not provide for adequate redress—and in-
terestingly enough, if the state provided immunity for the violation, then 
that was state action sufficient for Justice Frankfurter—could § 1983 be 
implicated.94 
The correctness of Monroe is beyond the scope of this Article. Even 
if Monroe was wrongly decided and state officers can only be held liable 
under state law for violating the authority granted to them by state law, 
Justice Frankfurter’s understanding of § 1983 might still be implicated if 
modern state law immunity is expansive. As I argue later, state immunity 
law has tracked the modern federal immunity law and, as such, may very 
well implicate § 1983 insofar as these immunities offer state law protec-
tion to officers for constitutional wrongs. Regardless, that Monroe may 
have been wrongly decided does not mean that federal immunity doctrine 
as it has evolved since the 1980s—to which this Article seeks to provide 
a corrective—is such a cornerstone of constitutional law that it cannot be 
corrected. 
Thus, we come to the earliest common law immunity case involv-
ing an individual officer, Pierson v. Ray.95 The action there probably 
could have been sustained under the pre-Monroe understanding of 
§ 1983. Several officers had arrested the plaintiffs for attempting to use 
segregated facilities at a bus terminal in Mississippi because of a state 
statute making it a misdemeanor to congregate in public “under circum-
                                            
 92. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 93. Compare id. at 202–59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), with Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 
574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 94. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If, for example, petitioners had 
sought damages in the state courts of Illinois and if those courts had refused redress on the ground 
that the official character of the respondents clothed them with civil immunity, we would be faced 
with the sort of situation . . . [of State sanction that] ‘would run counter to the guaranty of the Four-
teenth Amendment.’” (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)). For further discussion of 
Monroe, see supra text accompanying note 92. 
 95. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
2014] Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation 953 
stances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby.”96 
The statute was later found to be unconstitutional,97 but the officers at the 
time were acting under color of a statute. 
In any event, the lower court held that the officers would be liable 
notwithstanding that the statute was later found unconstitutional and that 
good faith (and probable cause) was a defense at common law for an il-
legal arrest.98 The Supreme Court first addressed the liability of the judge 
in the case, holding him absolutely immune from liability for his role in 
the convictions of the plaintiffs: “Few doctrines were more solidly estab-
lished at common law,” the Court declared, “than the immunity of judges 
from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial juris-
diction.”99 Echoing and citing Tenney, the Justices again supposed that 
Congress did not abolish this common law doctrine: “We do not believe 
that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983 . . . . The legis-
lative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish 
wholesale all common-law immunities.”100 As with immunity for legisla-
tors, the doctrine of judicial immunity “is equally well established, and 
we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it 
wished to abolish the doctrine.”101 
As for the officers, under the common law of torts, “the prevailing 
view in this country [is that] a peace officer who arrests someone with 
probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence 
of the suspect is later proved.”102 The same principles ought to apply to 
enforcement of a statute later found to be unconstitutional.103 Thus, the 
Court held that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which was 
“available to the officers in the common law action for false arrest and 
imprisonment, [wa]s also available to them . . . under § 1983.”104 
The Court ostensibly began to deviate from this common law in-
corporation method in Scheuer v. Rhodes105 and Wood v. Strickland,106 
and perhaps considered policy more than common law history.107 That is 
                                            
 96. Id. at 549. 
 97. Id. at 550 (citing Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 553–54. (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872)). 
 100. Id. at 554. 
 101. Id. at 554–55. 
 102. Id. at 555. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 557. 
 105. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
 106. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
 107. Several authors claim or assume that policy arguments drove the Court’s decision. See, 
e.g., John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard, 75 
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not a necessary reading of those opinions, however. In Scheuer, the 
Court found a qualified immunity for executive officials (such as the 
governor) “dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of 
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the 
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.”108 Yet this 
holding did not derive out of whole cloth from the Justices’ own policy 
views. It derived from the common law principles discussed in Pierson, 
where an officer who acts in good faith and with probable cause is im-
mune from liability.109 It was an extension of the common law principle 
with respect to police officers; there was a common law tradition of im-
munity for executive officers. 
In Wood, the finding of immunity for school officials who did not 
in bad faith violate the constitutional rights of students (in this case by 
expelling a student) was again an extension of the good faith principle 
established in earlier cases.110 Even if it was a “policy” extension of 
those same principles, the Court, addressing the statute before them—
§ 1983—relied “on those same sources in determining whether and to 
what extent school officials are immune from damage suits” that were 
discussed in the previous § 1983 cases.111 The same is true of Procunier 
v. Navarette,112 where the Court held that violation of a right established 
only after the actions in question occurred was not “clearly estab-
lished.”113 Thus, the development of immunity doctrine was still a matter 
of statutory interpretation, even if the Court was giving less attention to 
specific common law analogs. 
Finally, in Owen v. City of Independence,114 the Court engaged in 
an analysis of the common law to determine that municipalities had no 
good faith defenses to § 1983 liability.115 Thus, as late as this case in 
                                                                                                  
CORNELL L. REV. 462, 472–73 (1990); Adam L. Littman, A Second Line of Defense for Public Offi-
cials Asserting Qualified Immunity: What “Extraordinary Circumstances” Prevent Officials from 
Knowing the Law Governing Their Conduct?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 645, 648 n.36 (2008); David 
P. Stoelting, Comment, Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement Officials in Section 1983 Excessive 
Force Cases, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 243, 259 (1989). 
 108. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247. 
 109. Id. at 243–44. 
 110. Wood, 420 U.S. at 318. 
 111. Id. at 320. One author has written that while Wood continued the Court’s traditional reli-
ance on common law, the “pedigree” of the two-pronged test including the objective “clearly estab-
lished” element is “uncertain.” Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special 
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 68 (1989). 
 112. 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 
 113. Id. at 565. See generally Saiman, supra note 34, at 1160 (discussing Wood and Procunier 
as early uses of the “clearly established” standard). 
 114. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
 115. Id. at 638–50. 
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1980, the Court was still engaged in what was fundamentally a statutory 
interpretation analysis. The Court by now was also considering policy, 
but as in Owen, it was largely doing so to buttress its conclusions with 
respect to the common law doctrines.116 
It is my contention that the Supreme Court erred in the following 
decade when it divorced immunity doctrine from the common law and 
focused solely on policy. Examining why the Court began this deviation 
will lead to a fuller understanding of the theoretical legitimacy of the 
common law approach and the theoretical problems with the modern ap-
proach. I argue that, whether intentionally or not, the Court developed 
modern qualified immunity doctrine—based solely on its particular con-
ception of public policy—in the context of Bivens actions against federal 
officials. It appears that, when not confronted with a statute to interpret, 
the Justices did not feel constrained by considerations of statutory inter-
pretation. That is, they did not feel constrained by the common law histo-
ry so relevant to § 1983 cases. Our problem arises as a result of the Court 
deciding that it would be impractical to have a separate immunity doc-
trine for federal cases under Bivens and state cases under § 1983, for it 
also decided to import the immunity doctrine from the federal cases into 
the state cases, thus divorcing § 1983 from all common law analysis. 
B. Bivens and Modern Qualified Immunity 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics,117 the Supreme Court opened the door to claims against federal 
officials for the violation of constitutional rights. Whether Bivens is cor-
rect as an originalist matter ultimately will not matter much for our pur-
poses.118 What is important is that the Court seems to have dramatically 
altered qualified immunity doctrine in the context of Bivens actions when 
it had less need (if any at all) to shape the doctrine as a matter of statuto-
ry interpretation. The doctrine may have been trending in this direction, 
but it was in the context of Bivens that matters of policy took the reins 
completely and the Court abandoned any common law underpinnings to 
immunity doctrine. 
                                            
 116. See, e.g., id. at 650–56. 
 117. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 118. Interestingly, one might observe that if Bivens provides a cause of action directly under 
the Fourth Amendment, then even state officials can be sued without the need to invoke § 1983 
because the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated against the states. (Incorporation is another 
relevant doctrine whose correctness is questionable but perhaps ultimately unimportant for our pur-
poses.) 
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The key turning points were Butz v. Economou,119 Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald,120 and Anderson v. Creighton.121 These cases all involved Bivens 
actions or other claims against federal officials on the basis of federal 
law. In Butz, the plaintiff sued officials in the federal Department of Ag-
riculture and alleged violations of the First Amendment and other federal 
rights, claiming they retaliated against him for levying criticism against 
the agency.122 The Court examined the existing case law respecting the 
liabilities and immunities of federal officers for violations of constitu-
tional rights, reciting cases dating back from as early as 1804.123 The 
Court acknowledged that none of these cases dealt with a federal official 
acting clearly outside the scope of his duties, but it noted that several 
cases have addressed that issue in the context of state officials sued under 
§ 1983.124 
It thus addressed those § 1983 cases and concluded that federal of-
ficials should have no more immunity than their state counterparts: 
None of these decisions with respect to state officials furnishes any 
support for the submission of the United States that federal officials 
are absolutely immune from liability for their constitutional trans-
gressions. On the contrary, with impressive unanimity, the Federal 
Courts of Appeals have concluded that federal officials should re-
ceive no greater degree of protection from constitutional claims than 
their counterparts in state government. 
. . . .  
We agree with the perception of these courts that, in the absence of 
congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for accord-
ing to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability 
when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens 
than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation 
under § 1983.125 
The Court held that federal officials were entitled to the same immunities 
to which state officials were entitled under Scheuer.126 
The move in Butz was crucial and not necessarily incorrect. Thus 
far, the Court was importing immunity doctrine developed as a matter of 
                                            
 119. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 120. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 121. 483 U.S. 632 (1987). 
 122. Butz, 438 U.S. at 480. 
 123. See id. at 489–96 (citing Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804)). 
 124. Id. at 495–96. 
 125. Id. at 498, 500. 
 126. Id. at 508–09. 
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statutory interpretation in § 1983 cases to federal cases not involving any 
statute whatsoever. It did not take long, however, for the Court to lose 
sight of the direction of this movement. It subsequently invented immun-
ity doctrine out of whole cloth in other federal-officer cases and exported 
that doctrine to the § 1983 cases rather than importing the relevant doc-
trine from the state-officer cases. In cases of first impression—such as 
excessive force cases decided under the Fourth Amendment—the court 
Could have determined how the immunities would operate under § 1983 
before creating immunities for federal officials in such cases. The Court 
instead, as we shall see, created immunities in these cases out of whole 
cloth without the benefit of any § 1983 cases. 
The next step in this transformation was Harlow, a Bivens First 
Amendment case.127 The Court reiterated the importation of the Scheuer 
immunity standard to federal officials in Butz.128 It further reiterated that 
the Court had held in Butz that it would be “untenable to draw a distinc-
tion for purposes of immunity law” between Bivens actions and § 1983 
actions.129 Then the Court took an additional unprecedented step: it de-
termined the scope of immunity based solely on public policy grounds. 
The common law was not mentioned at all in Harlow as a justification 
for its particular immunity holding, other than its conclusory statement: 
“As recognized at common law, public officers require this protection to 
shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potential-
ly disabling threats of liability.”130 
Instead, the Court discussed public policy reasons for refusing to 
adopt absolute immunity,131 followed by public policy reasons for adopt-
ing qualified immunity.132 It stated the following rule, not derived from 
any common law doctrine: “We therefore hold that government officials 
performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”133 
Anderson v. Creighton134 put the final nail in the common law cof-
fin by removing the last vestiges of the earlier approach. The plaintiff 
                                            
 127. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 128. Id. at 807. 
 129. Id. at 809 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)). 
 130. Id. at 806. 
 131. Id. at 808–13. 
 132. Id. at 813–19. 
 133. Id. at 818 (emphasis added) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). 
 134. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
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sued an FBI agent for a warrantless search of his home.135 Before Ander-
son but after Harlow cemented the “clearly established” rule, the Court 
still applied some of the earlier common law approaches to immunity 
cases in § 1983 actions.136 Summarizing the recent case law, Justice Scal-
ia described for the Court the qualified immunity test: “[W]hether an of-
ficial protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for 
an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective 
legal reasonableness’ of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules 
that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.”137 But moreover, 
Justice Scalia completely jettisoned the common law from the analysis. 
The plaintiff suggested that because at common law police officers were 
strictly liable for the warrantless search of a third party’s home, that was 
the standard the Court should adopt.138 Justice Scalia responded and, in 
the process, changed the nature of qualified immunity for the next twen-
ty-five years: 
[This] notion is plainly contradicted by Harlow, where the Court 
completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at 
all embodied in the common law, replacing the inquiry into subjec-
tive malice so frequently required at common law with an objective 
inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the official action. As we 
noted before, Harlow clearly expressed the understanding that the 
general principle of qualified immunity it established would be ap-
plied ‘across the board.’139 
The Court in 1992 confirmed in Wyatt v. Cole140—a § 1983 case against 
a state officer—that Harlow and Anderson had completely changed the 
immunity inquiry from one based on the common law to one based on an 
objective “clearly established” standard.141 
                                            
 135. Id. at 637. 
 136. It was a mixed approach whereby both common law standards and the Harlow standard 
were addressed, thus beginning the exporting of immunity law developed in federal-officer cases 
into § 1983 state-officer cases. In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), for example, the Court 
analyzed the common law rules for an officer issuing a warrant that leads to a false arrest. The Court 
first addressed the question under the common law approach, recognizing that “[o]ur initial inquiry 
is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the 
privilege he asserts.” Id. at 339–40 (citing Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984)); see also id. at 
339–43. It then seems to address the Harlow standard as well, though it is unclear how necessary 
that was to the opinion. See id. at 343. 
 137. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19). 
 138. Id. at 644. 
 139. Id. at 645. 
 140. 504 U.S. 158 (1992). 
 141. Id. at 165–67. 
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C. Conflating Bivens and § 1983: The Excessive Force Cases 
This evolution is of particular importance for excessive force cases 
because such claims were rarely charged against state or federal officials 
under § 1983 or Bivens until the Supreme Court held in 1989 that exces-
sive force claims were cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.142 By 
this time, the development of immunity into a doctrine divorced from 
common law or statutory interpretation was complete. Thus, courts never 
had the opportunity to discuss how excessive force cases would have 
been treated at common law and give the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tion against excessive force some historical support. Indeed, as discussed 
in Part III below, common law excessive force cases were hardly rare. It 
would not be unreasonable to presume that the founding generation 
would have understood the scope of the right against unreasonable sei-
zures in this common law context, just as the Court assumes the warrant 
requirement is informed by its common law background. As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, it would also be reasonable to assume that if the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was intended to give a cause of action against 
individual officers who used excessive force, then Congress would have 
intended to incorporate the common law method then existing for prose-
cuting such cases. 
Excessive force and qualified immunity first met at the Supreme 
Court in the context of a federal Bivens action in Saucier v. Katz.143 The 
courts of appeals had been finding qualified immunity challenging in 
excessive force cases, because the inquiry into the constitutional injury 
under Graham seemed to be equivalent to the objective reasonableness 
standard required by earlier qualified immunity cases.144 The Court in 
Saucier held that the standards were different. Qualified immunity does 
require, as a first step, an inquiry into whether a cognizable constitutional 
violation has occurred—thus, a determination of whether excessive force 
was used under the Graham objective reasonableness standard is neces-
sary.145 But then, as a second step, the courts must determine whether it 
was clearly established at the time that the particular use of force was 
                                            
 142. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see generally supra Part I. 
 143. See 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 144. Id. at 197, 199–200. For a discussion of the courts’ grappling with this issue, see Blum, 
supra note 10, at 219–20 and Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of 
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 145. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
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unconstitutional.146 There was no discussion of the common law whatso-
ever, either as a matter of original meaning of the Fourth Amendment or 
as a matter of statutory interpretation (because it was not a § 1983 case). 
A few years later, the Court decided Brosseau v. Haugen,147 this 
time a § 1983 suit against a state officer for excessive force.148 Notwith-
standing that the Court was now dealing with a statute—section one of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, or 42 U.S.C § 1983—it did not engage in 
statutory interpretation or discuss the common law at all, nor did it refer 
to the long history of common law immunity cases dating back to 1951. 
Without question, it merely applied the “clearly established” test devel-
oped in federal cases to the state-based § 1983 claim.149 
More recently, the Court decided a § 1983 case, Pearson v. Calla-
han,150 in which it abandoned the strictness of the two-part Saucier quali-
fied immunity inquiry.151 The Court gave the lower courts discretion to 
consider either of the two prongs as the initial inquiry.152 There was no 
discussion of common law or statutory interpretation. The Court assumed 
without argument that the qualified immunity framework developed in 
Harlow and Anderson applied.153 
As a result of this doctrinal evolution, modern courts are inundated 
with excessive force cases, with panels of the same circuit often disa-
greeing on qualified immunity in very similar circumstances. But more 
significantly, plaintiffs who have suffered at the hands of overzealous 
and abusive law enforcement officers are often left without relief.154 The 
clearly established standard is extremely difficult to prove at the low lev-
el of generality at which the courts analyze it. A court may have held that 
three taser shots when a suspect resisted the first order is not excessive, 
but that does not mean it is clearly established that five taser shots when 
the suspect resisted only the third repetitive order is unconstitutional. 
Very little is clear or established under modern qualified immunity doc-
trine. 
                                            
 146. Id. at 204–07; see also Saiman, supra note 34, at 1156 (describing the two-part test devel-
oped by Saucier). 
 147. 543 U.S. 194 (2004). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 198–99. 
 150. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 236. 
 153. Id. at 231–32. 
 154. At either the federal or state level. I will have more to say on this later, see infra note 226 
and accompanying text, but for now it will suffice to point out that state immunity law has evolved 
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This state of affairs can be remedied. As this Part has shown, com-
mon law immunities were traditionally held to have been incorporated 
into § 1983 as a matter of statutory interpretation. This approach was lost 
before excessive force cases became prevalent in the federal court system 
because of a faulty conflation of immunity doctrine in Bivens actions and 
§ 1983 actions. Even if the Court wanted to have only one immunity doc-
trine, it should have imported the doctrine from the § 1983 cases into the 
federal cases. Instead, by happenstance and accident—most likely by 
virtue of the temporal order of the cases the Supreme Court happened to 
agree to hear—it developed a qualified immunity doctrine in federal cas-
es totally divorced from the common law that it then exported to the 
§ 1983 cases.155 
The next Part examines evidence from common law excessive-
force cases to determine what the common law approach was. The rest of 
the Article will then return to first principles and argue that, as a matter 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation, courts should return to the 
common law. 
III. EXCESSIVE FORCE AT COMMON LAW 
A. Blackstone and Some Early Cases 
Any discussion of common law doctrine must start with Black-
stone. Regardless of whether he was accurate on all the common law 
doctrines he explicated, it has been well-established that his views great-
ly influenced the Founders.156 With respect to § 1983 suits, this Article is 
mostly concerned with how the common law treated excessive force cas-
es around 1871; presumably, that is the common law the Congress of 
                                            
 155. I should emphasize that my historiography of the Court’s qualified immunity cases is my 
own interpretation of events. Although no one can prove that the advent of Bivens actions muddled 
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111. 
 156. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW 3–4 (1941); Anthony J. 
Franze, The Confrontation Clause and Originalism: Lessons from King v. Brasier, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 
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1871 incorporated when it wrote section one of the Civil Rights Act 
(which became 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Yet Blackstone must be the starting 
point because he is one of the earliest authorities and thus sets the back-
ground for such cases in the coming century. Further, insofar as this   
Article argues that the common law method should be adopted in Bivens 
actions directly under the Constitution, the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment to the founding generation is directly relevant. 
Although Blackstone did not write on the issue of “excessive 
force,” his analysis of the immunities of public officers is instructive. 
From his discussion, general principles of immunity doctrine as it existed 
at the time of his writing emerge. The following elements are particularly 
relevant to future developments in § 1983 and immunity law: whether 
the common law’s test was an objective or subjective one; whether it was 
the province of the judge or the jury to decide these cases; and whether it 
was expected that officers would be personally liable for damages at law. 
Blackstone’s work echoes the concern that modern Supreme Court 
Justices have expressed regarding the challenges officers face in the exe-
cution of their duties. The law must give them much discretion, for the 
offices of the justices of the peace and other law enforcement 
are such and of so great importance to the public, that the country is 
greatly obliged to any worthy magistrate, that without sinister views 
of his own will engage in this troublesome service. And therefore, if 
a well-meaning justice makes any undesigned slip in his practice, 
great lenity and indulgence are shewn to him in the courts of law.157 
“But, on the other hand,” writes Blackstone, “any malicious or tyrannical 
abuse of their office is usually severely punished; and all persons who 
recover a verdict against a justice, for any willful or malicious injury, are 
entitled to double costs.”158 Thus far it would appear that subjective in-
tent matters a great deal at least for the criminal prosecution of misfea-
sors. Intent, after all, has always been a crucial element of a criminal act. 
However, Blackstone suggests that subjective intent does not matter 
in civil cases and may not matter even in some criminal cases. Note that 
at common law any individual could “prosecute” someone in the courts 
by virtue of an indictment; the government could institute criminal pro-
ceedings on its own accord with the issuance of an information.159 
                                            
 157. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 354 (Forgot-
ten Books 2012) (1765–1769). 
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With this background in mind, consider Blackstone’s following 
discussion: 
But the courts of king’s bench have frequently declared that though 
a justice of peace should act illegally, yet, if he has acted honestly 
and candidly, without any bad view or ill intention whatsoever, the 
court will never punish him by the extraordinary mode of an infor-
mation, but will leave the party complaining to the ordinary method 
of prosecution by action or indictment.160 
Thus, it appears that subjective intent, while naturally necessary for a 
criminal prosecution on the part of the government, is not necessary for 
an action at law commenced by the wronged party or a criminal action 
“prosecuted” by the wronged party as a private citizen. In those actions, 
good faith may have been no defense. 
Blackstone continues in the same footnote, after pointing out the 
procedural protections granted to justices of the peace accused of wrong-
doing, to say, “Indeed, where a justice has committed an involuntary er-
ror, without any corrupt motive or intention, it may be questioned wheth-
er it is an indictable offence [sic]; for the act in that case is either null and 
void, or the justice is answerable in damages for all the consequences of 
it.”161 While the last clause seems somewhat ambiguous, in light of the 
preceding discussion it can be justly paraphrased as follows: It is not a 
criminal offense, because it is either null or void, or in any event the jus-
tice is answerable in an action for damages. Taken together, these state-
ments suggest that it was accepted at common law that subjective intent 
does not matter. The exceeding of authority—which can be determined 
objectively—is sufficient to make officers liable. 
Blackstone’s discussion is at a high level of generality. Might ex-
cessive force cases have been treated in some particular way that refute 
these general principles? It is hard to locate English cases from this peri-
od relating to the use of force that were not disposed of on some techni-
cality of pleading. But such cases did seem to occur at least occasional-
ly.162 We even have some reasoning in some cases; they are not too de-
                                            
 160. BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at 354 n.17 (emphasis added) (citing Rex v. Palmer, 2 Bur. 
1162 (1761)). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. We know, for example, that one Mr. Waller sought an information against one Richards, a 
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short paragraph dealing with the extent of notice required in such an action. Anonymous, 1 
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constable for battery done in the course of his office. Anonymous v. Heylers, Croke, Car. 174 (1629) 
(Eng.). 
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tailed or helpful, but they are at least not inconsistent with Blackstone’s 
description. 
In the 1697 case of Truscott v. Carpenter and Man,163 the plaintiff 
was seized by officers for failure to pay a debt, and he alleged “trespass, 
assault, battery, wounding[,] and imprisonment.” The court of the King’s 
bench held that while the authority to imprison implies the right to com-
mit a battery, it is not an unlimited right: 
[I]f an officer has a legal process to arrest a man, yet he cannot beat 
him, unless he resists; but no such thing appears here, and therefore 
for this reason also the plea is ill. . . . And of this opinion was the 
whole Court; for where an express battery is laid it is not enough to 
justify the imprisonment upon legal process, which includes a bat-
tery; but the defendant ought to go on, and shew that he arrested the 
plaintiff, and the plaintiff offered to rescue himself, and so the de-
fendant was compelled to beat him. For otherwise if it be not upon 
some such occasion, a man cannot justify a battery in an arrest.164 
Similarly, in the 1736 case of Williams v. Jones, the question was 
“whether a battery of the plaintiff can be justified by shewing an arrest 
by lawful process,” and “upon consideration of the cases,” the court was 
of the opinion that “a battery cannot be justified by shewing an arrest 
barely; but that in order to make it good, something further should be 
shewn: as . . . that the plaintiff made resistance, and was going to rescue 
himself, and by reason of that he beat him to take him.”165 
These cases are less instructive regarding the issue of reasonable 
force,166 but when tying them back to the general principles related in 
Blackstone, it appears that subjective intent was not a feature of such 
claims. An officer had to show an objective reason (e.g., flight or re-
sistance) that justified the use of force. Ill will or malice was not a con-
sideration. 
The point is important because a major concern of the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Graham was precisely the subjective malice component 
of the Glick test that it overturned.167 Further, this same concern is partly 
what motivated the Court to abandon the old common law immunity de-
fenses—which often depended on subjective good faith—for the objec-
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tive “clearly established” test under modern doctrine.168 Blackstone and 
these cases show, however, that at least with respect to excessive force 
cases, subjective intent was no consideration in an action at law. Thus, at 
least one of the policy reasons the Court has advanced for the modern 
variant of qualified immunity is nullified in these cases. 
Additionally, the assumption in all these cases is that an officer is 
personally liable at law for any excess force he uses. An officer is only 
immune from liability for those batteries committed with justification. 
This liability speaks to the Supreme Court’s other significant policy rea-
son for modern immunity doctrine: that officers should not have to risk 
their personal financial resources except for the most exceptional errors 
in judgment. As the Court famously said in Pierson v. Ray (one of the 
first immunity cases discussed in Part II), “A policeman’s lot is not so 
unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of 
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted 
in damages if he does.”169 
At common law, however, being “mulcted” in damages was pre-
cisely the deterrent for errors in judgment. To be sure, in the centuries of 
Coke and Blackstone, the public officers had tremendous wealth. Black-
stone explains that it was a requirement of the various public offices that 
the occupant have sufficient wealth so they could afford the fines and 
damages for their transgressions.170 This personal liability may be a doc-
trine unfit for the modern police force, as some scholars have observed: 
The liability of the individual official for wrongdoing committed in 
the course of his duty on which so much praise has been bestowed 
by English writers, is essentially a relic from past centuries when 
government was in the hands of a few prominent, independent and 
substantial persons, so-called Public Officers, who were in no way 
responsible to ministers or elected legislatures or councils. . . . Such 
a doctrine is utterly unsuited to the twentieth-century state, in which 
the Public Officer has been superseded by armies of anonymous and 
obscure civil servants, acting directly under the orders of their supe-
riors, who are ultimately responsible to an elected body.171 
This observation is undoubtedly true but does not mean the doctrine 
should be abandoned. After all, it is more consistent with common law to 
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let a jury decide under the common law standard whether a transgression 
has occurred and what the damages are. The solution for the modern day 
dilemma is not to abandon liability but rather to indemnify officers for 
their wrongs. That way the state—the equivalent of high officers—pays 
the price for its agents’ transgressions.172 
B. Police Force in Conducting Arrests: 1786–1871 
After the American Revolution, as modern police forces arose in 
cities for the first time, we saw an increase in the number of excessive 
force cases. The common law courts of the various states, relying upon 
fundamental common law principles, began developing a framework for 
analyzing such cases. The state of the common law in 1871 is particular-
ly relevant. We thus begin with the service of process and arrest cases 
from 1786 to 1871.173 However, the decades after also offer evidence of 
how the common law was seen at the time, and some cases from this pe-
riod will be discussed as well. Given the dearth of cases in the 1700s, the 
earliest cases after the founding offer only some suggestion as to how the 
founding generation would have understood excessive force in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment. 
Some courts developed a test that included both a subjective and an 
objective component, but this was the exception. More often than not, the 
courts settled on a single objective inquiry: Did the officer use more 
force than was necessary to accomplish his purpose? If so, then he was 
personally liable for the excess. It would appear that the Graham test is 
quite consistent with this common law inquiry, insofar as its factors are 
relevant to a determination of the question.174 The common law cases 
reveal, however, that beyond this inquiry, there were no immunities, and 
whether an officer used excessive force was always a question for the 
jury, not the judge. 
The 1786 case of Gilbert v. Rider175 sheds some light on how the 
founding generation (and after) may have understood the limits of police 
force. The court did not pass judgment on this particular issue, but the 
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reporter had written the following: “Gilbert peremptorily refused to go 
any other way; his obstinacy obliged the officer to bind him, and compel 
him to go by force; he used no greater force than was necessary.”176 This 
reasoning implies that officers believed it necessary to plead that they 
used no more force than was “necessary” as a defense to actions, such as 
in Gilbert, for trespass or false imprisonment in conducting an arrest. 
In an 1824 case from Kentucky, the state’s high court again did not 
directly address the issue, but it declared that a plea from the defendant-
constable was insufficient when it did not describe what the precept (in 
this case, a capias pro fine) commanded the constable to do (e.g., arrest 
and imprison the plaintiff).177 The court did not take issue with the rest of 
the plea, in which the defendant argued he should be absolved because 
“he did use only so much force, and no more than was necessary to put 
into execution the commands of said precept.”178 This opinion offers the 
first glimpse of the “no more than necessary” test that would come to 
define most common law cases in this era. Indeed, not only does the 
Kentucky court raise no qualms with the language (perhaps no error was 
raised), requiring the constable to aver what he was commanded to do 
was crucial for a finding of excessive force: if the defendant does not 
plead what he was commanded to do, it would be difficult to determine 
whether he used more force than necessary for his purpose. 
An excessive force case from 1854, arising in the context of a sher-
iff (or his agent) serving process, demonstrates a similar principle. In 
Hager v. Danforth,179 Danforth procured from the justice of the peace a 
subpoena to serve on Hager for purposes of a pending suit. Danforth en-
tered the kitchen door, which was open, and encountered Hager’s wife, 
who ordered him to leave.180 Danforth sought to go upstairs to serve 
Hager but the wife resisted, so Danforth “choked her and threw her back 
against the catch of a door, and slightly bruised her.”181 The trial judge 
instructed the jury that once Danforth was ordered to leave, he was not 
justified in continuing his attempt to serve the subpoena.182 
The state supreme court disagreed. Having a legal license to make 
service in the house, he “[d]eriv[ed] his authority to be there from the 
law”; therefore, “[i]f he used more force than was necessary to enable 
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him to accomplish his purpose, to that extent [only] he is liable as a 
wrongdoer.”183 The judge ought to have instructed the jury “that the de-
fendant was justified, notwithstanding such resistance, in using all the 
force necessary to enable him to serve the subpoena, and that he was on-
ly liable for any excess of violence used by him more than was necessary 
to overcome the resistance with which he met.”184 The test was thus an 
objective one, and the limits of the use of force were strictly governed by 
the purpose for or the necessity of its use. The case was remanded for a 
new trial, and it is unclear whether a jury would have found the force 
excessive. For whatever reason (perhaps the parties settled), it does not 
appear that there was a second trial. 
State v. Lafferty, an 1845 case, squarely addressed the issue of nec-
essary force in the arrest context. In that case, a city watchman, Lafferty, 
arrested the “prosecuting witness,” Barclay, who resisted and fled; “Laf-
ferty struck [Barclay] several times with a stick.”185 “The case rested on 
the questions whether the defendant arrested Barclay under circumstanc-
es requiring the interference of the police officers; and whether, after the 
arrest, he used unnecessary force and violence in attempting to carry him 
to a place of custody.”186 
The court answered: 
The officer has no right to use force where no force is necessary, or 
reasonably anticipated to be necessary; nor ever to beat an unresist-
ing man. For such abuse of authority he would be very properly 
held responsible even to an exemplary extent; but where he keeps 
within the line of his duty he is entitled to protection. The jury will 
judge of this matter from the evidence.187 
The standard in this case was necessity—not clearly unreasonable. 
The question was whether more force than necessary was used. Further, 
the question of necessity was decided by a jury rather than a judge. Final-
ly, this was a state prosecution instigated by a private party. It would ap-
pear that in the 1800s, states had few qualms prosecuting police officers 
for any excesses in the line of duty. The officers were responsible for 
their excesses to an “exemplary extent.” 
Golden v. South Carolina,188 from the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina, is particularly instructive as it was decided in 1870, only one 
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year before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. Significantly, this was 
a state prosecution of a police officer by indictment at the instigation of 
the assaulted individual (who was the “prosecutor” of or “informer” in 
the action).189 The prosecutor alleged that the defendant, police officer 
Joseph Golden, struck Christopher Suhrstedt “several severe blows with 
his policeman’s club, upon the head and arm, by means of which 
his . . . arm was broken.”190 The defendant countered that he saw another 
member of the police attempting to lead Suhrstedt’s wagon horse; that 
Suhrstedt was “crazy drunk” and being taken to a guardhouse; that as he 
came up to the wagon, Suhrstedt was pulling the reins such that Golden’s 
leg was caught between the wagon and the wheel; that when Suhrstedt 
refused to “loose the reins,” the officer, “for the sole purpose of freeing 
himself from his perilous position, reached over with his club and struck 
said Suhrstedt a light blow on his arm or hand,” at which point his leg 
was freed; and that by this time another police officer got into the wagon 
and threw Suhrstedt, “who was still resisting, down in the wagon.”191 A 
modern reader cannot help but think, plus ça change. Back then, at least, 
juries appear to have been more skeptical of police officers. The jury 
convicted Golden, and the judge not only sentenced the officer to pay a 
fine of one hundred dollars, but also to four months’ imprisonment 
should he default on it.192 
The trial court had instructed the jury that if the defendant “used 
only proper and sufficient force for [the] purpose” of securing Suhrstedt 
as a prisoner, “then he is excused, and should be found not guilty.”193 
The officer claimed on appeal that the court was wrong to reject two oth-
er proffered instructions: that if the officer was engaged in the discharge 
of his duties, then he should be found not guilty; and that if the defendant 
acted in good faith, “without malice, passion, or ill will,” then he should 
be found not guilty.194 
The South Carolina Supreme Court had no problem rejecting the 
first proffered instruction: “The doctrine claimed in the first would give a 
latitude to public officers, in the execution of their duty, which would be 
dangerous to the public, and subversive of the proper relation which, as 
conservators of the peace, they should maintain to the community.”195 
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The South Carolina Supreme Court then held that the trial court had 
“correctly laid down the law”: 
It is not every resistance that will justify an enormous battery. The 
force applied must have a due regard to the purpose it is to accom-
plish. It is allowed, when it may be necessary to overcome, by its 
interposition, the violence which is opposed to prevent the due ex-
ercise of the authority with which the officer is charged. If it pro-
ceeds beyond the limit of the necessity which originally permitted 
its use, it is no justification. 
. . . This proposition assumes that the person goes no further in the 
use of force than the law allows; for when one who, for instance, 
has the right to inflict personal chastisement on another under him, 
proceeds with it to an illegal extent, he becomes guilty of an assault; 
and, generally, where the force is authorized, it must not exceed 
what is necessary, else the excess will be criminal.196 
The test is objective: Did the officer “exceed”—or “proceed[] be-
yond the limit of”—the necessity which warranted the use of force? The 
court explicitly rejected the other proffered instruction on good faith: the 
jury is welcome to infer from the facts the intent to do harm. If in making 
the arrest the defendant “used more force than was sufficient and proper, 
from this the jury may construe a wrongful intent.”197 
Almost all cases and authorities from this period seem in agree-
ment: the test is one of necessity to accomplish a given lawful purpose,198 
which is a question for the jury,199 and courts should have no qualms 
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holding officers personally liable for damages.200 Subjective intent and 
good faith featured in some cases,201 but this was rare. 
The extant evidence before 1871 demonstrates these propositions to 
a reasonable degree of certainty. Because so few cases from the period 
exist, summarily examining excessive force cases developed in the dec-
ades immediately following the passage of the Civil Rights Act may pro-
vide additional insight into the common law principles in these cases as 
they were understood in 1871. 
With the rise of modern police forces, excessive force cases became 
a lot more common. The flavor of the common law did not change much 
in these decades. The test tended to be objective: Did the officer use as 
much force as was necessary to accomplish his purpose, and no more?202 
The test occasionally varied with at least one court suggesting that the 
jury should assess the facts as they appeared to the officer.203 In sub-
stance, however, these tests are the same; although some courts insisted 
on a subjective inquiry,204 these seem to have been the exception rather 
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than the rule. The question was one for the jury,205 and it was expected 
that police officers would be subject to the “severest penalties” for use of 
unnecessary force.206 
C. Conclusion: The Common Law’s (Objective) Rule 
The common law had a very different approach to excessive force 
cases. The test was objective rather than subjective, like modern doc-
trine, but it was emphatically the province of the jury to decide the rea-
sonableness of the action. There were no immunities beyond those the 
jury was willing to grant, and the officer was to be personally liable or 
indemnified by the state. The rest of this Article asserts that as a matter 
of statutory and constitutional interpretation, the common law approach 
should govern in § 1983 cases as well as in federal-officer cases. 
IV. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
There are two ways by which one may conclude that the courts, as a 
matter of principle, ought to adopt the common law method for trying 
excessive force cases. The first is that the original understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment—which applies both to federal officers and state of-
ficers (through incorporation)—subsumed the common law principles. 
The second is that as a matter of statutory interpretation, courts are justi-
fied in incorporating common law principles into section one of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871. The result would be the same because we have dis-
covered throughout this piece that the common law allowed for no spe-
cial immunities in these cases. If the officer used reasonable force—in 
the same way that an officer may have in good faith executed an invalid 
warrant—then he is immune from liability. If the officer used excessive 
force—in the same way that an officer may have known that a warrant 
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was invalid—then he is liable. Whether we define this principle as an 
“immunity” or simply as a “right” seems inconsequential. 
What this Article aims to show is that the Court’s current qualified-
immunity approach is not justified by either interpretive method. The 
current approach is inconsistent with original meaning, and it is incon-
sistent with applying common law background principles to broad stat-
utes. Furthermore, it is a doctrine the Court has invented out of whole 
cloth, for either policy reasons or because of an accident of history (as 
described in Part II). As a matter of statutory and constitutional interpre-
tation, the modern doctrine is hard to justify. 
This Part thus begins with an examination of the “meaning” of the 
Fourth Amendment as understood in 1789 and 1871. It argues that as an 
originalist matter, the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as it was un-
derstood in 1789 ought to govern in Bivens actions, even if the Bivens 
court was wrong as an originalist matter to provide a cause of action di-
rectly under the Fourth Amendment. Further, the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment in 1871 ought to govern § 1983 cases. Assuming incorpora-
tion doctrine to be correct, the Fourth Amendment rights as understood 
by the drafters in 1871 are the rights § 1983 protects. 
Put differently, to know when a federal officer has violated the 
Constitution by using excessive force, for which he is liable under 
Bivens, we must know what “unreasonable seizures” meant to the 
Founders. Similarly, to know when a state officer has violated the Con-
stitution by using excessive force, for which he is liable under § 1983, 
we must know what “unreasonable seizures” meant either to the drafters 
of the statute of 1871, or to the Founders in 1789 (if the drafters in 1871 
were originalists). In either case, we must understand the common law to 
understand the constitutional right. 
A. Common Law Principles and the Fourth Amendment 
Under modern Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court as-
sumes that common law principles shape the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment rights. As one scholar has written, “[T]he Supreme Court has de-
clared that the principal criterion for assessing whether searches and sei-
zures are ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the Constitution is 
whether they were allowed by eighteenth-century common law.”207 Sev-
eral Supreme Court Justices explicitly rely on the common law when 
                                            
 207. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739, 1739 (2000). 
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interpreting the Fourth Amendment.208 As Justice Scalia has said, “In my 
view, the path out of [doctrinal] confusion should be sought by returning 
to the first principle that the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.”209 Or 
in the more recent controversial case of United States v. Jones, Justice 
Scalia wrote for the majority: “Consistent with this understanding, our 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,” 
and, “What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable 
searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of 
protection it afforded when it was adopted.”210 
If one assumes that the common law does indeed inform Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, and assumes that to be a good thing, then the no-
tion that the common law’s excessive force cases should help define un-
reasonable seizure is unobjectionable. The argument can end here; those 
Supreme Court Justices who adhere to this Fourth Amendment 
originalism ought to adopt the common law approach discussed in Part 
III without much hesitation. 
Of course, some judges and scholars oppose the use of common law 
principles to inform the scope of Fourth Amendment rights.211 Yet oth-
ers, such as Akhil Amar, argue that a more complete return to common 
law principles would dramatically improve what is (or was as of 1994, 
when he was writing) a complete doctrinal mess.212 Many scholars, 
moreover, acknowledge that if we are originalists, then we must read the 
Fourth Amendment in light of the common law because that is, indeed, 
how the founding generation understood it.213 
This Article has little to contribute to this debate. This Article has 
already made many significant (yet reasonable) assumptions—that Mon-
roe v. Pape was rightly decided, for instance.214 It now makes the addi-
tional assumption that originalism is correct; or at least, it claims that if 
we assume originalism to be correct—and many do today—then modern 
courts ought to treat excessive force cases as the common law treated 
                                            
 208. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 197, 211 n.47 (1993) (collecting quotations). 
 209. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 210. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 953 (2012) (emphasis in original). 
 211. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 207. 
 212. See Amar, supra note 172, at 800–18. 
 213. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 668–724 (1999). 
 214. Though as discussed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1991) and supra text accompany-
ing note 92, § 1983 may be implicated even without Monroe given expansive state-law immunity 
doctrines. 
2014] Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation 975 
them. Thus, this section merely draws an obvious conclusion once we tie 
the common law approach with this modern theory of constitutional in-
terpretation. 
There is nothing different about Bivens actions that require the 
Court to fashion judicial remedies untethered from the common law. The 
rights that federal officers can potentially violate are still defined by the 
Fourth Amendment—which is itself shaped by the common law—
whether or not Bivens was correct to provide a cause of action directly 
under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, even though the Court has taken the 
liberty to “use any available remedy to make good the wrong done” 
when federal rights are violated,215 if the original understanding provides 
an adequate remedy, then there is no theoretical or practical reason to 
diverge from it. 
In sum, federal Bivens actions for the use of excessive force ought 
to track common law principles. Part III discussed what those principles 
are, and they involve no immunities of the kind in today’s modern doc-
trine. The test is very much like the test in Graham v. Connor, as previ-
ously explained:216 it was an objective and not a subjective test; it was 
the province of the jury—not the judge, who so often decides these cases 
today—to judge the reasonableness of the force; and finally, it was ex-
pected that officers would be civilly liable for their transgressions. While 
there are not many early cases on point, those that exist, along with the 
authority of Blackstone, are consistent with these principles. 
B. Incorporation and the Fourth Amendment 
This section provides a constitutional interpretation argument for 
adopting the common law approach to excessive force cases in § 1983 
actions. This section, too, will be brief, because it takes but one step far-
ther from those which the preceding section has taken. This step assumes 
that as an originalist matter, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states. That is still to this day a 
hotly disputed proposition.217 Even if one disagrees with this proposition, 
it is so ingrained in our law that we may as well assume it to be true for 
purposes of this argument. 
The argument goes as follows: If incorporation is “true” as an 
originalist matter, then the congressional authors of the Civil Rights Act 
                                            
 215. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971). 
 216. See id. and supra text accompanying note 16. 
 217. For one of the best articles disputing the correctness of the incorporation theory, see Philip 
Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61 (2011). 
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of 1871 presumably understood it to be true. This leads to the conclusion 
that constitutional rights ran against state officers as well as federal of-
ficers, which means that a state officer could violate the Fourth Amend-
ment as it was understood at the time and be prosecuted for the violation 
(even if federal officials could not be prosecuted until Bivens almost a 
century later). 
Thus, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as the 
meaning of that right was understood in 1871 (or perhaps 1789), is the 
right that plaintiffs could enforce against state officers by virtue of sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. But the meaning of unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, as I argue and as others have argued as well,218 
is manifestly connected to the common law history of the Fourth 
Amendment. That history includes actions for excessive force at com-
mon law. Therefore, the common law treatment of excessive force cases 
fleshes out the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (or perhaps is incor-
porated in it), which is then incorporated against the states in the Four-
teenth Amendment, and which is finally made enforceable against state 
officers in the 1871 Civil Rights Act.219 
V. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
This final Part offers an independent route, via statutory interpreta-
tion, to the same conclusions arrived at in our constitutional inquiry for 
§ 1983 cases. It is worth taking this independent route to see where it 
goes because it is the route by which the courts have traditionally inter-
preted § 1983 and from which modern qualified immunity doctrine has 
deviated. 
There are two initial hurdles the following statutory interpretation 
analysis must overcome. Justice Scalia suggests the first in his dissenting 
opinion in Crawford-El v. Britton.220 What is the point of adhering to 
common law immunities in § 1983 actions when the underlying under-
                                            
 218. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 213. 
 219. Indeed, it is worth noting here that one of Justice Scalia’s key complaints about Monroe v. 
Pape is that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had only provided for fifty or so prosecutions between 1871 and 1961. 
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, he argues, it was not 
intended to provide a general federal remedy for constitutional torts committed by state officers. Id. 
Incorporation, however, provides an alternative explanation of the dearth of cases: If the protections 
of the Constitution did not run against state officers until incorporation took hold in the 1940s–60s, 
then there would have been very few opportunities to apply § 1983 to state officers. Only when these 
rights applied to state officers did the issues of personal liability in Monroe and subsequent § 1983 
cases arise. 
 220. Id. 
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standing of the statute that Monroe v. Pape engendered bears no resem-
blance to what the Congress of 1871 had in mind? 
As Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion, 
Monroe changed a statute that had generated only 21 cases in the 
first 50 years of its existence into one that pours into the federal 
courts tens of thousands of suits each year, and engages this Court 
in a losing struggle to prevent the Constitution from degenerating 
into a general tort law. . . . Applying normal common-law rules to 
the statute that Monroe created would carry us further and further 
from what any sane Congress could have enacted.221 
Again, the correctness of Monroe, which has been debated thor-
oughly in the academic literature,222 is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Monroe certainly has its originalist justifications, ranging from purpose, 
to legislative intent, to a not unreasonable textual reading, discussed in 
the opinion itself223 as well as in the literature.224 
One possible reason that the civil rights statute generated so few 
cases in its early years is that federal constitutional rights did not apply 
against state officers until incorporation in the 1940s–60s. A plaintiff 
cannot sue a state official for an unreasonable search under § 1983 if the 
Fourth Amendment does not even apply to the state officer.225 In any 
event, we can proceed with our exercise simply accepting Monroe’s cor-
rectness. Even if its interpretation was a judicial invention, does it follow 
that judges should take any and all liberties with the statute? 
An answer lies in the all-too-pertinent analogy that Bivens presents, 
which Part IV has already discussed. Conservatives may lament that 
Bivens is unoriginalist—that the original Fourth Amendment did not 
provide a self-enforcing cause of action—but now that the Court has in-
terpreted it to include precisely such a cause of action, the Court is not 
free to reinvent the meaning of the Fourth Amendment wholesale. There 
is a limit to what the Court can do with any legal text, even after it has 
diverged from its original meaning. In the context of Bivens, the Court 
has permitted itself to “fashion” the judicial remedy that it created, just 
as it fashioned suppression doctrine, but surely even a conservative such 
                                            
 221. Id. 
 222. Compare Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color Of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Sec-
tion 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985), with Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under 
Color Of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992). 
 223. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172–87 (1961). 
 224. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 222. 
 225. The Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states only in 1949. Wolf v. Colora-
do, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see also supra note 219. 
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as Justice Scalia could agree that the judicially fashioned remedy should 
adhere as closely as possible to what the founding generation would have 
understood the Fourth Amendment to provide. 
Moreover, even if suits against officers should be heard in state 
courts, the immunity laws of several states have evolved to track the ro-
bust federal immunity law226 and might thus implicate § 1983 under Jus-
tice Frankfurter’s understanding of the statute. In other words, it may be 
that these suits should be in state court, but if that were so, plaintiffs still 
will not recover because these states follow a federal immunity law 
which itself developed from a faulty conflation of federal and state cases 
in § 1983 suits. This expansion of state immunity doctrines may very 
well trigger § 1983 even under Justice Frankfurter’s more limited view 
of the statute. He believed that if, for example,  
petitioners had sought damages in the state courts of Illinois and if 
those courts had refused redress on the ground that the official char-
acter of the respondents clothed them with civil immunity, we 
would be faced with the sort of situation . . . [of State sanction that] 
‘would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’227 
The second hurdle is choosing a method of statutory interpretation. 
A textualist or purposivist reading of § 1983 may not accord with a read-
ing informed by legislative intent or background principles of law. As the 
Court said in one of its early immunity cases, “The statute . . . creates a 
species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities, and some 
have argued that it should be applied as stringently as it reads.”228 Fur-
ther, the purpose of the statute is remedial, and such statutes are (at least 
under one canon of construction) broadly construed. In the words of Jus-
tice Douglas, dissenting in Pierson v. Ray, “Nor should the canon of con-
struction ‘statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly con-
                                            
 226. For example, the two largest states in the Fifth Circuit follow federal immunity law. Cantu 
v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 808 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Thus, Texas’ law of qualified or official immunity is 
substantially the same as federal immunity law.”); Moresi v. State, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093–94 (La. 
1990) (“The same factors that compelled the United States Supreme Court to recognize a qualified 
good faith immunity for state officers under § 1983 require us to recognize a similar immunity for 
them under any action arising from the state constitution. . . . If the defendant shows that the state 
constitutional right alleged to have been violated was not clearly established, the defendant is enti-
tled to qualified immunity.”). 
 227. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 
25, 28 (1949)); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 228. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). 
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strued’ be applied so as to weaken a remedial statute whose purpose is to 
remedy the defects of the preexisting law.”229 
On the other hand, both judges and legislators presume the exist-
ence of certain background principles of the common law. As Justice 
Douglas acknowledged, “Congress of course acts in the context of exist-
ing common-law rules.”230 There is evidence from the congressional de-
bates that at least some members of Congress specifically intended that 
common law principles would apply.231 
Moreover, each method of interpretation—or each rung on the 
“funnel of abstraction,” from the more concrete (text) to the more ab-
stract (general principles of law)232—suffers from certain problems. For 
example, the purpose and intent of the legislature is difficult to define. 
Justice Scalia has quite properly said that what legislators leave out of a 
statute evinces as much “purpose” as what they put in, and thus “pur-
pose” may be a meaningless interpretive tool.233 While some congress-
men may have specifically intended for common law principles to apply 
to section one of the Civil Rights Act, others specifically understood or 
believed that the statute would allow for no immunities.234 
This Part will not reinvent the wheel of statutory interpretation. It 
makes the strongest case for incorporating common law principles into 
the statute based on the most concrete and then the most abstract “rungs” 
on the funnel of abstraction. As one goes up and back down the levels of 
abstraction, from text and legislative intent, to purpose and background 
principles of law, a stronger and stronger case emerges for incorporating 
common law doctrines in general and in excessive force cases in particu-
lar.235 
                                            
 229. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 232. For a discussion of this concept, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND 
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A. Text and Language in Context 
There may be good textual reasons to assume the incorporation of 
common law principles in § 1983. If Justice Douglas was correct that the 
language of the statute admits of no immunities, then the constitutional 
analysis in Part IV governs without exception. This textual reading 
would provide further support for the interpretive claims in Part IV. 
However, that is not the claim of this section. Rather the point is that 
even if we assume the Congress of 1871 incorporated these principles, 
they do not justify immunity in excessive force cases, where the common 
law allowed for no immunities beyond what a jury was willing to grant. 
The best textual argument for incorporating common law immuni-
ties is the common-sense notion that words only have meaning in broad-
er contexts, and Congress understood that it was legislating within the 
context of the common law. John Manning has been the most prominent 
advocate of this contextual approach in his defenses of textualism. As he 
has written in a lengthy passage, 
If textualists were literalists, it would be easy to understand the at-
traction of equitable interpretation. Modern textualists, however, are 
not literalists. In contrast to their early-twentieth-century predeces-
sors in the ‘plain meaning’ school, they do not claim that interpreta-
tion can occur ‘within the four corners’ of a statute, or that ‘the duty 
of interpretation does not arise’ when a text is ‘plain.’ Rather, mod-
ern textualists acknowledge that language has meaning only in con-
text. As discussed, they believe that statutory language, like all lan-
guage, conveys meaning only because a linguistic community at-
taches common understandings to words and phrases, and relies on 
shared conventions for deciphering those words and phrases in par-
ticular contexts. Hence, textualists ask how ‘a skilled, objectively 
reasonable user of words’ would have understood the statutory text, 
as applied to the problem before the court. 
The ‘reasonable user’ approach gives textualists significant room to 
account for the nuances of language, a factor that is especially sig-
nificant in a mature legal system with a rich set of background legal 
understandings and conventions. Textualists, of course, often con-
sult dictionaries as an important historical record of the ways in 
which speakers have used words in the past. But they do not stop 
there. As Judge Easterbrook once put it, a dictionary is merely ‘a 
museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means to de-
code the work of legislatures.’ Like any reasonable language user, 
                                                                                                  
only that it does not seem at all odd to do in statutory construction cases what we already do in con-
stitutional interpretation cases. 
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textualists pay attention to the glosses often put on language (even 
in ordinary usage), the specialized connotations of established terms 
of art, and the background conventions that sometimes tell readers 
how to fill in the gaps inevitably left in statutory directions. Each of 
these considerations focuses on faithfully decoding the text while 
sharply reducing the basic justification for the equity of the stat-
ute.236 
Applying Manning’s argument, a textualist would consider how a 
reasonable observer in the public would have understood the language 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws” in the civil rights statute.237 Reasonable observers 
may have understood that these words meant that the rights, privileges, 
and immunities secured by the common law would apply. The common 
law is part of the “laws,” and the Constitution’s meaning is informed by 
its common law history. That is not to say that the common law exclu-
sively defines these rights, but merely that it would be one source of law 
that explicates the meaning of the statutory provision. 
One might object that this “textualism” is nothing but purposivism, 
intent, or some other kind of interpretive method in textualist’s clothing. 
And perhaps it is. But that does not make it objectionable; it makes it 
eminently sensible. A better way to look at it, however, is that as one 
goes up and down the funnel of abstraction, the textual meaning itself 
becomes clearer.238 
It seems fair to say that this approach is still textualism. McGinnis 
and Rappaport lend support to this approach in their own recent article 
on constitutional interpretation.239 “The possibility of multiple meanings 
would be significantly reduced or eliminated if legislators understood 
that the words of a law would be interpreted in accordance with applica-
                                            
 236. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 108–
09 (2001) (internal citations omitted); see also John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation 
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ble rules,”240 they write. “Not only would the background rules promote 
the enactment of laws with a single meaning, they would also facilitate 
the determination of that meaning.”241 
The legislative history also reveals the importance of the common 
law background. Only three members of Congress actually raised the 
concern that official immunity would be lost with the passage of section 
one of the Civil Rights Act.242 These were opponents of the bill who had 
“an incentive to exaggerate the bill’s effects.”243 Moreover, some legisla-
tors specifically responded that these concerns were overwrought be-
cause the common law already afforded protections.244 
One should keep in mind the purpose of legislative debate and be 
cautious of reading too much into the legislative history.245 That history 
offers enough evidence, however, that some and quite possibly most 
members of Congress—and thus probably the public at large—expected 
statutes to be interpreted in light of their common law meanings. At least, 
they understood that their words did not exist in a vacuum. How else 
would courts come to decide on questions of punitive damages, equitable 
relief, statutes of limitations, survival of claims, causation, and the like, 
which were not spelled out in the civil rights statute?246 
Because the legislative history is somewhat ambiguous, the next 
stop in our statutory interpretation analysis is a general discussion of the 
background principles of law accepted in 1871. They reveal that com-
mon law principles generally governed ambiguity and fleshed out the 
meaning of words such as privileges or immunities. A stronger case thus 
emerges for incorporating common law principles into excessive-force 
cases pursued under § 1983. 
                                            
 240. Id. at 760. 
 241. Id. 
 242. David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the 
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 507 & n.62 (1992). These three congress-
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 243. Id. at 505 n.52 (citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964)). 
 244. See Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under §1983: A Legal and Eco-
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 246. Cf. Beermann, supra note 111, at 51. 
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B. Background Principles and Legislative Intent 
David Achtenberg has described the method of statutory interpreta-
tion well-known and well-used at the time of § 1983’s passage as the 
“Golden Rule”: legal interpreters subject textual language “to the ‘golden 
rule’ that a statute should not be read literally if doing so would lead to a 
result which Congress could not have intended.”247 Part II described in 
depth the Court’s historical and constitutional arguments in Tenney v. 
Brandhove.248 Achtenberg cites Tenney as a prime example of the golden 
rule method of statutory interpretation. 
The golden rule is rooted in a theory of legislative intent. “The 
42nd Congress did not act in a contextual vacuum,” writes Achten-
berg.249 “Legislative immunity was not an insignificant rule of the com-
mon law, known only to the most scholarly members of the legal profes-
sion. It was a fundamental political principle deeply embedded in Anglo-
American history.”250 If the intent is what governs, then common law 
rules and deeply held political principles must inform the textual analy-
sis. Congress would have expected them to do so. 
This type of interpretation was common in 1871. “The Golden Rule 
Approach represents a type of interpretation with which the lawyers in 
the forty-second Congress would have been familiar. It was frequently 
utilized in the early nineteenth century,” writes Achtenberg.251 He cites 
opinions from Chief Justice Marshall in the early 1800s, to the famous 
statutory interpretation cases of United States v. Kirby252 and Holy Trini-
ty,253 to confirm this position.254 
Although Achtenberg himself implies that the golden rule approach 
is not satisfactory in immunity cases, his reasons are not fully convinc-
ing. He argues that it is wrong because it assumes that a recognition of 
immunities is inconsistent with a literal reading of the text.255 Regardless 
of approach—whether jurists believed they were interpreting the mean-
ing of the words, or simply interpreting the intent of Congress—the con-
clusion is the same: common law immunities should flesh out meaning to 
give full import to the statute’s words, or to be consistent with intent. In 
either case the result is the same. 
                                            
 247. Id.; see also Achtenberg, supra note 242, at 512. 
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Achtenberg then argues that the golden rule approach “fails to rec-
ognize the evidence that Congress did not intend to resolve immunity 
issues itself, but rather intended to give the Court some discretion to do 
so on a case-by-case basis.”256 That may be true, but it does not contra-
dict the importance of using common law to inform the outcome of cas-
es. 
Achtenberg’s third criticism is more persuasive: no unitary body of 
common law existed at the time for Congress to incorporate.257 “The 
common law of tort was fragmented both geographically and substan-
tively. . . . The early twentieth-century efforts of the American Law Insti-
tute Restatements to bring order out of chaos implicitly recognized that 
chaos did exist.”258 
Fortunately, at least with respect to excessive force cases, the com-
mon law courts of the various states appear to have been in agreement 
about the principles that govern in such cases. Part III has shown that 
there was, at the time, at least a body of common law in excessive force 
cases that courts can presume Congress to have incorporated into the 
statute. 
Ultimately, as Achtenberg himself acknowledged, the golden rule 
approach to interpretation was accepted in 1871. Whether or not we ac-
cept it today, it helps us understand as a textual matter what the drafters 
meant by the words they enacted. It helps us understand as well the legis-
lative intent of the drafters. The background rules against which they 
were drafting were not only common law rules; as the Court in Tenney 
suggested, they were also deeply held political and constitutional princi-
ples. But common law rules were one major source of law that legislative 
drafters expected would apply. 
This does not mean that written words could not amend or shape 
the common law background principles. As Achtenberg describes, the 
early common law immunity cases adapted text and history to each oth-
er: 
If a particular immunity would interfere with [the] purposes [of the 
statute], it would be irrational to conclude that Congress could not 
have meant to abrogate it. Thus, an immunity will be recognized if, 
but only if, it meets both conditions: it must have been a well-
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established common-law immunity in 1871 and its existence must 
be compatible with the purposes of § 1983.259 
But more importantly, the text and the principles reinforce one another. 
Some have continued to criticize the Court’s incorporation of 
common law immunities on the grounds that there was no coherent 
common law at the time260 or that the history is too indeterminate.261 As a 
matter of theory, however, perhaps one can always dispute the specifics, 
but it is difficult to dispute the generalities: statutory authors and the ed-
ucated public understood that laws were written in a broader historical, 
political, and legal context and that those laws would be interpreted in 
light of that context and its background principles. 
To bring us back full circle, none of this is to say that the Court’s 
historic common law immunity cases suffer from no analytical, histori-
cal, or theoretical flaws. They very well may be imperfect. The claim 
here has only been that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the com-
mon law immunity cases are much more satisfying than the Court’s quite 
literally invented qualified immunity doctrine, which arose in a context 
divorced from the requirements of statutory interpretation. If the com-
mon law approach were recovered, then excessive force cases could be 
assessed in light of their common law predecessors. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY OBJECTIONS ANSWERED 
This Article has attempted to demonstrate the following: As a result 
of historical accident or a misguided policy decision by the Supreme 
Court, excessive force cases, coupled with qualified immunity doctrine, 
bear no resemblance to the common law mode of trying such cases. The 
modern doctrine makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to recover, for 
plaintiffs to get to a jury, and for courts to distinguish cases on a princi-
pled basis. Yet that need not be the case. 
Not only is the common law approach more practical and perhaps 
more fair and reasonable, it is also an approach more theoretically con-
sistent with interpretive methods in both constitutional and statutory in-
terpretation. The common law shaped the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment in both 1789 and 1871, and it shaped the meaning of the 
statute, which the courts have long presumed to have incorporated com-
mon law methods and immunities. 
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The common law approach to excessive force cases also does not 
raise the policy concerns that led the Court to adopt modern qualified 
immunity doctrine in the first place. One concern was the need to aban-
don the subjective component to many of the common law tests. As the 
Court said approvingly in Anderson v. Creighton, modern immunity doc-
trine has replaced “the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently re-
quired at common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasona-
bleness of the official action.”262 
We have learned, however, that at least in excessive force cases, the 
common law doctrine was an objective test. While some cases adopted a 
subjective component, these cases were few and far between. The test 
was a straightforward one that a jury could apply: Did the officer engage 
in more force than was necessary for accomplishing his purpose? His 
good faith or ill will did not matter at all, except insofar as they might 
help a jury conclude that the force was objectively reasonable or not. 
In completely abandoning the common law when the plaintiff sug-
gested its application in Anderson, Justice Scalia also worried about the 
level of generality at which the common law principles would have to be 
applied: 
The approach suggested by the Creightons would introduce into 
qualified immunity analysis a complexity rivaling that which we 
found sufficiently daunting to deter us from tailoring the doctrine to 
the nature of officials’ duties or of the rights allegedly violated. Just 
in the field of unlawful arrests, for example, a cursory examination 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that special excep-
tions from the general rule of qualified immunity would have to be 
made for arrests pursuant to a warrant but outside the jurisdiction of 
the issuing authority, §§ 122, 129(a), arrests after the warrant had 
lapsed, §§ 122, 130(a), and arrests without a warrant, § 121.263 
Justice Scalia then excoriated this approach as “complex” and “un-
suitable.”264 
In the first place, statutory interpretation may not require applying 
the common law at such a level of detail. When the drafters of the 1871 
Act and the public that read of it understood its language in the context 
of common law principles, it does not necessarily follow that the com-
mon law alone is what applies. It may be that the drafters and public 
would have understood the language to incorporate such detail, but it is 
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just as plausible that they did not. But moreover, this concern does not 
apply in any case to excessive force claims because those common law 
cases expressed principles—those discussed in Part III—at a rather high 
level of generality. 
We might also worry about officers being “mulcted” for damages if 
they err in judgment;265 but the common law expected officers to be 
mulcted in damages for their errors in judgment. Some courts explicitly 
stated that the law expected that officers would be grievously punished 
for such errors. Although officers may have had greater wealth in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, indemnification by the state may 
resolve this financial concern while staying more true to the common 
law. 
Finally, it is indeed problematic that § 1983 has devolved into a 
general tort statute. This Article has explained that historically these ex-
cessive force cases were tried in state common law courts. At least one of 
the Fifth Circuit cases described in Part I included a state criminal trial 
against the officer as well266—just as the state criminally prosecuted of-
fending officers in the 1800s. Perhaps these cases should be heard in 
state courts today. As this Article has explained, however, because state 
law immunities now track the expansive federal immunity doctrine, these 
immunities might trigger the original understanding of § 1983 liability in 
any event. These cases might therefore be heard in federal court anyway, 
and as long as that is so, the federal judiciary should adopt an approach 
that is more fair and workable and that is all at once more consistent with 
widely accepted methods in both constitutional and statutory interpreta-
tion. 
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